Abstract
Introduction
As we all know, the continuos European integration process changes domestic policies of European nation-states, whether it i s due to direct EU regulation or indirectly through the creation of regulatory competition. But are domestic policies influenced by European paradigms even if there is no EU adaptation requirements? Is the EU as a matter of fact framing the possibilities f or domestic policy choices? Or is the EU in a more or less deliberate manner being a means of serving domestic political interests through the legitimisation of certain policy reforms? This paper deals with the assumption that domestic level policies are b eing changed due to the articulation of a "need" for adaptation to the European Union.
Initially the paper discusses recent theories of europeanisation, especially as regards the importance of public discourse in initialising domestic "adaptation" to the E U. Thus the cognitive dimension of politics and policy-making is vital. Through case analysis of the processes leading to the creation of the Danish tax reform in 1993 and the new Competition Act in 1997, domestic policy changes legitimised through the conception of a "need for adaptation" to the "inevitable" European integration, are examined. Finally, the paper discusses whether such domestic policy changes are resulting in simple adaptation or fundamental institutional transformation of policy regimes.
"Europeanisation" -Metaphor or real world dynamics?

The concept of Europeanisation
As it often seems to have been the case in political science when research in a new field is in its dawn, the evolving interest for and focus on Europeanisation processes has created an increasing scope of definitions on what these developments encompass. This is probably a natural consequence of the many different research traditions in the field. They all focus on specific (and different) a spects in the integration processes that will have to be encompassed by the definition. The field is growing rapidly, but the great expansion of definitions also leads to an inappropriate stretching of "europeanisation" as an analytical concept (Radaelli 2000 , Cole & Drake 2000 . 1 The concept of "europeanisation" is often used in the same sense as other related but different concepts such as "globalization" and "internationalization". In some cases these concepts are used in an embracing manner in order to express homogeneous societal dynamics and developments, e.g. increased international collaboration and free movement of information, capital, goods and labour. In other cases these concepts are defined and specified as expressing different, but interrelated developments and dynamics. Without undertaking an encompassing discussion of different conceptualisations this paper relies to a large extent on Schmidt's (2001: 2) definition of europeanisation as: "a set of regional economic, institutional, and ideational forces for change affecting n ational policies, practices, and politics". 2 The definition is based on a top-down focus on the europeanisation processes, which means that domestic change of policies and processes taking place due to influence from the EU, is the primary object o f this study. Furthermore it is possible to encompass both the immediate and concrete changes as well as the diffusion of new understandings (the cognitive dimension). It is assumed that europeanisation is not only limited to deliberate EU induction of domestic policy change.
A methodological implication when studying europeanisation is the importance of considering counterfactuals. According to Schmitter (1999) the net effect of the EU seems to be to complement (and, probably, to enhance) trends that were already affecting domestic democracies. "Evidently, the relative importance of European integration as a source of executive change can only be a ssessed if it is systematically compared with rival or complementary explanations. Put differently, having "disentangled" the European effect, Europeanisation research has to contextualise it and explore its interactions with other sources of change" (Goetz 2000: 227) . To consider rival alternative hypotheses will be of great importance in order to confront counte rfactuals (Radaelli 2000) .
This will be a main point in the coming discussion and challenge of the theoretical assumptions of framing europeanisation mechanisms, especially as regards not-EU-induced europeanisation of d omestic policies.
In the following c hapter the paper discusses the infant-stage tools for europeanisation analysis. A central assumption is that europeanisation can be measured through direct change of policies or 2 Globalization is defined as: "a set of international economic, institutional, and ideational forces for change affecting national policies, practices, and politics" (Schmith 2001: 2) . Another conceptual distinction is the one of Moses et al. (2000) , who define globalization as: "the distortional effects on national income strategies and on the autonomy of economic policies due to free movement of capital, and the ideological convergence due to fast and free flows of information and communication". Europeanisation is defined as the fact: "that European institutional and political integration and convergence processes change the national social and economic policies". (Moses et. al. 2000: 4-6) . While europeanisation cause change in national policies due to integrat ion and convergence processes, globalization cause distortion and convergence due to faster and freer movement of capital and information.
institutions (through policy legislation), but not least through indirect change connected to domestic political legitimisation acts, which in this paper, are claimed to be an underestimated mechanism of europeanisation.
Theoretical assumptions of europeanisation mechanisms
As mentioned, theories of europeanisation are still in an infant stage of development. A few interesting contributions in the field have been adduced (e.g. Kohler-Kock 1996 , Knill and Lemkuhl 1999 , Radaelli 2000 , Cowles et.al 2001 Schmith 2001) . In an article reflecting on the existing e uropeanisation literature, Radaelli (2000) distinguishes between three different mechanisms of eur opeanisation (inspired by Knill and Lemkuhl 1999) . These include negative integration; positive i ntegration; and the soft mechanisms of "framing integration", which initially have a cognitive europeanisation impact. 3 As such, this paper deals with mechanisms of framing integration. 4 Radaelli (2000) distinguishes between three "soft" "framing" mechanisms of europeanisation, respectively framing policies (Knill and Lemkuhl 1999) , cognitive convergence (Radaelli 1997) , and the importance of the mode of governance (Kohler-Kock 1996 . Aspects of the first and second type of framing mechanisms will appear in the cases in this paper.
"Framing policies" as proposed by Knill and Lemkuhl (1999) are characterised by providing European support by triggering European integration within the existing political context at the national level, rather that being directed at prescribing integration within the existing political context at the national level. Knill and Lemkuhl (1999: 10) explain three different dynamics by which European policies facilitate or stimulate domestic reform. Those are: a) by providing leaders with additional legitimacy for their reform models; b) by assisting in the deve lopments of solutions for domestic problems; or c) by altering the expectations and beliefs of domestic actors, which may finally facilitate the overcoming of institutional veto points.
3 Negative integration (market-making regulation without a prescriptive model (indirect impact)) refers to old regulatory policies (e.g. internal market policies, competition policies), which define conditions for market access and market operation in order to secure the proper functioning of the Internal Market (see Scharpf 1996 Scharpf , 1999 Taylor 1983) . Positive integration (market-shaping re-regulation with a prescriptive model (direct impact)) refers to new re-regulatory policies, which prescribe concrete institutional requirements, with which the national states must comply. The new regulatory policies (e.g. consumer protection, environmental protection, and sections of social policy) are designed to curb negative externalities emerging from market activities. Framing (cognitive) integration refers to indirect europeanisation due to the altering of beliefs and expectations of domestic actors. These policies (e.g. taxation policies, railroad policies, etc.) are designed to change the political climate by stimulating and strengthening the overall support for broader European integration and reform objectives (See Knill and Lemkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000) . 4 According to Radaelli (2000) the competition policy sector is an example of the europeanisation dynamics of "classical" negative integration. In this paper though, I claim that the explicated case in relation to the competition policy sector is a distinct kind of framing integration due to the involvement of the "need for adaptation" discourse in arguments for domestic policy reform.
Cognitive convergence (Radaelli 1997 (Radaelli , 2000 refers to policy sectors i n which there is an absence of EU directives and regulations for certain reasons. The establishment and presence of policy fora in which socialisation processes can take place is a possible channel of cognitive convergence.
As you will see in the following, the cases in this paper are though distinct cases in the category of framing integration. After the following analysis of this paper's two particular cases, we are to discuss whether we are really talking about examples of hitherto explicated types of framing integration or not. Now we turn to the explication of the two cases of EU legitimised domestic policy changes in Denmark in the 1990'es, respectively in the tax policy sector and in the competition policy sector. 3. How the EC/EU was used as an argument for carrying through domestic policy reform:
The 1993 tax reform
Background
In the late 1980'es, political discourse on taxation policies was to a large extent combined with discussions on the financing of labour market policies, primarily as a result of long lasting high unemployment rates, low growth, inflation, and increasing expenses on transfer payments. But due to a harsh domestic political environment in the Danish parliament (Folketinget) no compromise on how to handle the situation was reached from the mid -1980'es until 1993. From 1989 and onward, a new "problem" was recognised and used as an argument for the necessity of carrying through certain policy reforms in the Danish welfare state: the need for adaptation to the EC Internal Market developments.
"The great plans" of the Cabinet and the Social Democratic Party in opposition
In the spring of 1989 two large welfare policy reform proposals were presented in Denmark. The two different "plans" for reform were produced respectively by the Social Democratic party in opposition and by the cabinet coalition parties in government. 6 In April 1989, the Social Democratic Party put forward its proposal (named: "Get Going the Nineties") on how to reform taxation policies, labour market p olicies, and pension policies in Denmark. Among other things, a central recommendation of the plan was to rearrange (excise) d uties with regard to the need for adaptation to the EC (The Social Democratic Party 1989). While it was assumed that the difference in tax burdens among EC member states eventually would level out more or less automatically, it was also expected that an unavoidable pressure for political decisions on carrying through considerable adjustments in the tax system would become prevalent r ather quickly.
Danish taxation system to the EC was emphasised as an argument for the necessity of this Social Democratic proposed reform.
In May 1989, the cabinet coalition parties put forward their proposal for a welfare policy reform. It 
The continuation of the "need for adaptation" discourse -in different fora
Also in the Ministry of Finance considerations on welfare policy reform were carried out during these years, particularly with reference to the argument of a "need for adaptation" to the EC. As earlier mentioned, the financing of labour market policies was an important element in discussions 7 It was expected that other European countries would have to raise their level of taxation due to large budget deficits and the need for public service investment (as a result of the inclusion of women into the labour market). On the other hand, Denmark would rather easily be able to lower the tax level through stabilisation of public expenses etc.
on tax policy at the turn of the decade. Different possibilities for introducing gross income taxation and social contributions were intensely discussed in ministerial publications. The 1990 Financial
Review (Ministry of Finance 1990) included recommendations of labour market contributions (social contributions) administered by the labour market unions, and earmarked specific policies. This primarily due to the "need for adaptation" to tax systems in other European countries:
"Denmark's adaptation to Europe and the increasing internationalisation will definitely also be setting the agenda of the economic policy in the years ahead. The possibilities of free movement for businesses and the key workforce, and the increasing trade within the EC Internal Market, is both an opportunity and a challenge, which can increase growth and prosperity in Denmark. But these developments set demands. Among the demands is an adaptation of the Danish taxation system. This adaptation must take place both to avoid the negative consequences of the internationalisation for Denmark as a high-tax country, and to encourage the preferred structur al adaptation of the Danish economy. …The difference in tax structure between Denmark and the other countries makes it necessary to perform larger reorganisations of the tax system. It is almost not possible to rebut a reduction of the very high marginal taxes for high medium-incomes and high-incomes and it is necessary to lower the level of duties. If this could be financed by a reduction in public expenses, a reduction of tax allowances, and an increase in the amount of earmarked social contributions, it would furthermore express an adaptation to Europe" (Ministry of Finance 1990: 58-60).
8 Also university economists participated in the intense discussion on probable changes in the financing of public expenditure due to the integration into the Internal Market (See e.g. Sørensen and Andersen 1990). The conception that there was an inevitable need to change the structures of financing the welfare state because of a need for adaptation to the EC Internal Market was thus prevalent.
8 With a little less emphasis on the need for adaptation, the same recommendations were proposed in the 1991 Financial Review (Ministry of Finance 1991). In The Tax Policy Review from the same years, 1990 and 1991, a more critical attitude towards the "adaptation" recommendations was expressed (Ministry of Taxation 1990; 1991) . This illustrates an interesting difference in the more ideological thinking within the two ministries during these years (also expressed by the then Minister of Taxation Anders Fogh Rasmussen in an interview (Oct. 5 th 2000)). The two ministries held ministers from different parties, respectively the conservative Minister of Finance and the liberal Minister of Taxation.
As mentioned, many years o f negotiation between the minority government and the opposition parties -primarily the Social Democratic Party -had resulted in neither compromise nor any other problem-addressing output. Therefore both the Cabinet and the Social Democratic Party needed political legitimacy for enhancing action in order to address the problems of the high level of une mployment. 9 In December 1991, the parties in parliament set up a committee, consisting of experts as well as union representatives. This committee, named the "Zeuthen" Committee, was supposed to come up with legitimate solutions to help out "the structural problems in the labour market"
(Udredningsudvalget 1992). The main task of this committee was to consider the financing of l abour market policies and to contribute with proposals for new ways of financing labour market policies, thereby addressing the structural problems. But due to disagreement among participants within the Committee, especially between the different union representatives (representing respectively employees' and employers' organisations), the main purpose of the committee's proposal ended up consisting only of a recommendation of adapting the tax system to other EC memberstates (Ibsen 1992 ). This through a lowering of marginal tax rates. T he Committee was not able to come up with joint recommendations on what policies to obtain as regards the financing of labour market policies, except national tax system ada ptation to the EC.
The result -the 1993 reforms
Thus from 1989 to 1992 the ne ed for adaptation to the Internal Market was intensely used as an argument for carrying through tax reform. But no political compromise initiating concrete reform had been reached. In 1993 the newly formed Social Democratic -led majority government carried through a tax and labour market policy reform. But now the argument for reform was hardly any more "the need for adaptation" to the EC/EU. Rather the tax reform was carried through on other though questionable arguments. 10 The only "adaptation" argument left in 1993 was that such a rearrangement of the tax system was "necessary in order to assure that Danish businesses could benefit from the possibilities of growth and prosperity within the new open European market" (The Cabinet 1993b: 9). 9 The unemployment rate reached more than 12 pct. in the beginning of 1992. 10 In Goul 1998b ) the official aims of the tax reform are questioned.
The discourse of "need for adaptation"
This cognitive institution -the "necessity" for adapting the policies of the welfare state to the EC/EU -was thus prevalent in public discourse at the turn of the decade. Across the minds of p olitical decision-makers (expressed in "the great plans" and the ministerial publications and reviews), as well as experts and organised interests (expressed by university economist's advice and committee recommendations) an understanding of the functional necessity for adapting to the EC/EU and the Internal Market was prevalent.
This assumed need for adapting the tax system and other welfare policies was questionable though. The problem about the argument is that the premise was wrong. The difference in tax levels between Denmark and other EC countries were not (and are not) remarkable, when one includes in the picture the obligatory social contributions paid by employers in other EC member states. 11 Neither does the argument hold water when it was claimed that the tax structure was inappropriate in relation to the EC/EU (the Danish system was simpler, more transparent, and as competitive as other systems) or that the marginal taxes destroyed competition (they did not, see Goul Andersen 1998b: 129-131) . Nor could/can the EU be expected to h armonise taxes downward (why would anyone be interested in lowering taxes in other countries?).
Thus the perceived "need" for change initiated concrete action (and eventually change), though the content of the claim (that "there is a real need for change") was and still is questionable.
While the perception of a need for change was connected to recommendations of changing the tax structures, different national specific interests might have been the real forces behind the proposals for change legitimated by the inevitable "need for adaptation". We return to this later. Now we turn the second case: the 1997 Competition Act.
11 Social contributions have traditionally held no important position in Denmark compared to other European countries.
In other European as well as other Scandinavian countries different combinations of obligatory social contributions from employers and employees for social policies have been used. In Denmark it has always been a tradition to finance labour market policies as well as social policies etc. by direct and indirect taxes. Lassen and Nielsen (1996) have decomposed the yields from income taxes (based on work). They found that in 1992 in Denmark, 92,4 pct. of the yield from income taxes descended from wage income taxes while 6,4 pct. stemmed from obligatory social contributions. In France the same numbers were 15,5 pct. from wage income taxes while 80,6 pct. stemmed from obligatory social contributions. This was the case even though France in 1992 had a higher effective taxation of work income than Denmark. In 1997, around 3,2 pct. of all taxes in Denmark stemmed from social contributions. In France the same figure was 40,6 pct. (OECD 1999).
How EU policies were adopted through domestic policy reform, though there had been no deliberate EU induction: The 1997 Competition Act
From 1937 to 1997, the Danish competition legislation was based on the principle of control as well as the principle of public. 12 In 1997, the underlying principles in the Danish competition legislation were changed: from the principle of control to the principle of prohibition. This happened primarily due to the argument that domestic legislation "has to be changed" in order to fit with the legislation in the rest of the EU member-states, though there was no "de jure" EU requirement.
The initial phases (in which the issue was brought to the agenda)
In 1986, the MLU Committee, which was set up by the Minister of Industry in 1984, published its report on the state of affairs of the Danish competition legislation (Ministry of Industry 1986). 13 The purpose was to look at existing practices within the area of the competition legislation and to contribute with proposals for modernisation of the legislation. Regarding EC integration and the different principles in Danish and EC competition legislation, the c ommittee found no obvious advantages as regards changing the underlying principles. It was assumed that acceptable control options were still possible, with the principle of control as the basic principle in the competition legislation (Ministry of Industry 1986: 243). 14 Primarily based on the proposals in this report, a new Competition Act, in which the traditional principle of control was withheld, was passed in June 1989 and came into force in January 1990.
15
But at different occasions during the following years, the principle of control in the Danish competition legislation was brought back on the agenda. At this stage, Denmark was one of a few countries within the EC (see Table 1 control means that there is no limit on anti -competitive agreements as long as the competition authorities have not acted upon the particular case. The principle of public inhibits that all information on anti-competitive agreements and monopolies has to be made public, through the duty of notification as well as public registration. On the other hand, the principle of prohibition means that anti-competitive agreements are illegal from the moment they are carried through. As such, the competition authorities do not have to make a decision before a certain arrangement is considered illegal. 13 The title of the report was "From the Monopoly Act to the Competition Act" (Ministry of Industry 1986). 14 At this point of time, Denmark had been a member of the EC for 13 years. The different principles of the competition legislation in the EC and in Denmark had been prevalent for the same period, without creating significant problems.
in accordance with the principle of prohibition -and thus in accordance with EC competition le gislation in general. These policy changes in other Scandinavian countries did not pass unnoticed in
Denmark (see The Competition Council 1992: No 1,6,10). 17 15 A new element in this law was t he principle of transparency, which, in collaboration with the principle of control, was assumed to be effective as regards the control of anti -competitive arrangements. 16 Proposed by a parliamentary majority, which did not include the cabinet coalition parties. 17 Due to the Supreme Court saying that it seemed unreasonable to assume that the Prime Minister had not known that he misinformed the Parliament about the (illegal) actions of the former Minister of Justice.
The breakthrough period
After the resignation of the Prime Minister -and therefore the resignation of the whole Conservative-Liberal Cabinet -a new majority government was formed. It consisted of the S ocial Democratic Party, the Social -Liberal Party, the Centre-Right Party and the Christian Peoples Party.
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In February 1993, the OECD published the OECD Economic Survey on Denmark in which a particular survey on competition policies had been carried out (OECD 1993) . 19 Based on the analysis of the Danish competition policies, a harsh critique of the Danish competition legislation was expl icated in the OECD publication. The main critique was that competition was not strong enough to lower the price level in order to reach the EC average and the level of other countries comparable to
Denmark. This due to the preventive effects being way too weak. The OECD therefore proposed to introduce the principle of prohibition in the national competition legislation in order to create the proper incentives for businesses and in order to be able to impose administrative fines in case of anti-competitive practices or abuse of dominant position (vertical restraints) (OECD 1993: 72) . 
The change to EU adaptation of the competition legislation
The change of principles, which was carried through by the 1997 Competition Act, was a great change in principle tradition. 26 But what was of greater practical importance was the declared EU conformity of the competition legislation. This meant that the Danish competition legislation for an infinite span of time must be interpreted and administered in accordance with EU directives and practice (see Kogtvedgaard 2000: IV.B.2, for the legal consequences of this change). Therefore the important change was not only the change of competition legislation principles but also the change of deliberate intention as regards an ever-lasting EU conformity of national competition policies.
The "red thread" running through the whole Act meant that the law forever has to be administered in conformity with EU legislation and Dani sh authorities are as such not supposed to build up and use legal standards that differ from the EU principles.
The adaptation did not happen due to EU requirements. No treaty, directive or court decision ever required an adaptation of the national competition legislation in order to bring it in accor-dance with EC/EU principles. Rather it took place as a result of the situation that EU legislation tradition in the competition policy area was a better means of obtaining certain domestic political interests. In a short while we will return to this last point.
The process and extent of change
Are we, with these two explicated domestic policy reforms, dealing with cases of "framing policies" (Knill and Lemkuhl 1999) ? Or are we dealing with EU induced cognitive convergence in the a bsence of direct compulsion from Brussels (Radaelli 1997 (Radaelli , 2000 ? Or are we actually dealing with quite distinct cases of europeanisation: the legitimisation of domestic policy reforms by the reference to an "inevitable" "need for a daptation" to the EC/EU, though no deliberate EC/EU induction of domestic policy reform has been present? Neither in the tax policy sector nor in the competition policy sector there seems to have been EU compulsion or regulation forcing these particular policy changes through. Thus an important feature about both cases is that they do not seem to be EU i nduced: they do not seem to have been deliberately initiated by the EU. From an EU point of view they seem rather unintended though not "not-wished".
EC/EU as a dubious argument for carrying through tax reform
The assumption of a "need for adaptation" to the EC/EU was prevalent and heavily used as an argument for proposals for carrying through economic reform, especially as regards taxation policies, in the beginning of the 1990'es. The arguments behind this widely spread assumption were though questionable.
As such the intense exploitation of the "need for adaptation" discourse can be explained as an attempt to provide decision-makers with legitimacy for reform models. But different from Knill and Lemkuhl's assumptions, the legitimacy was not based on deliberate EC induction or concrete EC policies, but rather on a common interpretation of the consequences of the Internal Market d evelopments. In line with Knill and Lemkuhl one might also argue that the "need for adaptation" discourse was used as an instrument of altering the expectations and beliefs of domestic actors, with the purpose of facilitating the overcoming of institutional veto points. Again this explanation is questionable: the discourse seems to have been diffused across the political spectrum and not only among a few parties. 27 What makes this case of europeanisation differ from Knill and Lemkuhl's assumptions of framing integration is the lack of deliberate EC/EU policy induction.
While the perception of a need for change was connected to recommendations of changing the tax structures, different national specific interests might have been the real forces behind the proposals for change legitimated by the inevitable "need for adaptation". The idea of lowering highincome marginal tax rates as proposed by the conservative-led government, or the Social Democratic proposal of introducing social contributions thereby making the general tax level "less visible", are examples of such domestic political interests. As an argument for the necessity for carrying through policy reform -even reforms of very different origin and content -the "need for adaptation" was excellent both in scope and uncertainty as regards the future consequences.
EU as legitimisation of domestic political interests in the competition policy sector
The 1997 Competition Act was carried through mainly with reference to the OECD argument that competition was weak in Denmark why an adaptation to the EU principle of prohibition was advisable. With reference to this argument and to that fact that Denmark was "standing alone" with its "liberal" competition legislation, the 1997 Competition Act was passed, thereby entailing great change in principles.
In line with Knill and Lemkuhl this policy change could be explained as an OECD initiated altering of expectations in order to facilitate the overcoming of institutional veto points -in this case the interest organisations representing industries in Denmark. 28 But the problem in relation to this explanation is that (once again) there was never any deliberate EU attempt of creating domestic policy reform. 29 Rather it can be proclaimed that this magnificent policy change (as regards principles) in the competition policy sector took place as a result of a situation in which the EU legislation tradition in the competition policy area was a better means of obtaining certain domestic political interests. This assumption is based on the fact that the overall argument was that "other countries do it and therefore we have to do it" (see Folketingstidende 1992/93, tillaeg A, sp. 8145; Ministry of Trade and Industry 1995a: 10). 30 The Bill was to a large extent initiated by (or at least legitimated by) this OECD report, in which it was stated that the price level was too high, primarily due to a 28 Certain interest organisations, especially those representing industries, really disagreed in the necessity for adapting the competition legislation and implementing the prohibition principle etc. (see the hearing results: The Trade and Industry Committee 1997). An interesting difference between interest organisations is here the rather sceptical attitude by the organisations representing industries and the rather positive attitude by trade organisations. That the Act had to be implemented through three steps rather than all at once must be assumed to be in order to accommodate the strong opposition from some organisations. Still the change in principles and the declared intention of EU conformity must be considered quite a political victory for the government. 29 It could also be interpreted as a solution of domestic problems of weak competition -but here the assumption of causality seems more coincidental that intentional. 30 This is an illustration of the adjustment mechanism of mimesis (a mechanism of isomorphism). When countries have the option of joining EU policies or remaining outside, mimesis is a channel of europeanisation (see Radaelli 2000) . In this case, the force of mimesis was greatly inspired by the OECD report, which recommended adaptation to the EU principle of prohibition.
weak competition legislation. This was presumed to be bad for the consumers why the (ECsceptical) Socialist Peoples Party saw an opportunity to propose an "EC adaptation of the Danish competition legislation". What is the interesting point here is the fact that the EC-sceptical Socialistic Peoples Party suddenly seized the opportunity of obtaining domestic political interests by referring to a "need for adaptation" to EC legislation.
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Adaptation or transformation?
Thus the two case policy sectors have experienced great change in different ways. But are we tal king about simple institutional adaptation to economic integration or are we experiencing deeper institutional transformation and fundamental change? Is it pure absorption or is it paradigmatic i nstitutional change?
Regarding the tax policy reform in 1993, it is wrong to explain the policy changes as a result of EC/EU adaptation or harmonisation. The link between the two was that the widely perceived "need for adaptation" was heavily used as an argument for the necessity for carrying through tax reform. But the articulation of a "need for adaptation" was a means of paving the road for carrying through comprehensive policy reform. The actual change potentiality of the particular reform was considerable at that. With the introduction of general, obligatory social contributions earmarked for specific labour market policies (combined with considerable cuts in tax al lowances and a general "grossification" of transfer payments), the reform actually contained path-breaking potentiality as regards the financing of this Scandinavian tax-financed "social-democratic" welfare state (EspingAndersen 1990 ). This potentiality w as not exploited though. The importance of the social contributions therefore withered within a few years. As such the 1993 tax reform only resulted in secondorder change (Hall 1993).
Regarding Danish competition policies the case is an expression of paradigmatic instit utional change. 32 Today, the overall aim is not only to avoid monopolies within the Danish trade market and to establish convenient opportunities for Danish business in the international trade mar-31 Another interesting aspect is the fact that without the EU adaptation argument there had been a lack of arguments for the change of legislation principles. This as an important difference from the taxation policy sector in which the adaptation argument was only one out of many arguments, and by the end this argument was neglected. 32 If one includes the latest developments in the competition policy sector, certain interesting implications have occurred. According to a new Bill proposed in October 2001 (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2001), which so far seem to get passed in the parliament (Berlingske Tidende, October 12, 2001) , the authorities are given the opportunity to issue a prison sentence to the responsible persons in cartel cases. This goes beyond the tradition in EU competition legislation in which fines is the only possible means of punishment. As such you can say that domestic competition legislation in Denmark has become "Even more Europeanised than Europe". One might even talk about "Americanisation" of the Danish competition legislation, as this new tool in competition policy is inspired by American competition legislation.
kets (as it primarily was until the late 1980'es). Within the 1997 Competition Act and the subsequent changes in the competition legislation, a prevalent "red thread" is the declared conformity with EU competition legislation "whatever it brings". The full establishment of the Internal Market is the new overall aim as opposed to the aim of taking care of Danish business interests. As such one can talk about an alteration in the very logic of political behaviour in the competition policy sector -and therefore third-order changes (Hall 1993).
Conclusion
As shown, domestic level policy changes in the tax policy sector and the competition policy sector in Denmark, have been legitimised through the interactive process of articulating the "need for adaptation" discourse. The interesting object of analys is has been the not-EU-induced europeanisation of domestic policies connected to domestic political legitimisation acts. This paper has therefore been operating with quite distinct cases of the framing europeanisation mechanisms of "framing policies" and c ognitive convergence, due to that fact that the case policy changes have not been deliberately induced by the EU but domestically legitimised by "the EU".
As regards tax reform, an understanding of the functional necessity for adapting to the EC/EU and the Internal Market was prevalent at the turn of the decade. The assumed need for adaptation of the tax system and other welfare policies was questionable though. As an argument for the necessity for carrying through policy reform -even reforms of very different origin and contentthe conception of a "need for adaptation" was very suitable. This altogether resulted in the "need for adaptation" discourse.
Danish competition policy experienced a great change in principle tradition in 1997. But what was of greater practical importance was the declared EU conformity of the competition legislation. This adaptation did not happen due to EU requirements. The policy change is rather to be explained by EU legislation tradition being a better means of obtaining certain domestic political interests. Thus the EU served as legitimisation of domestic policy reform, initiated by the ECsceptical Socialist Peoples Party. This opportunity to obtain domestic political interests by referring to a "need for adaptation" to EU le gislation principles was exploited. And the result was considerable institutional change in the policy sector.
As such, it is appropriate to talk about institutional transformation rather than simple adaptation to economic integration, though these two cases explicate very distinct kinds of europeanisation due to the lack of deliberate EU induction. The 1993 tax reform only resulted in second-order change, but it contained third-order potentiality that could have shown to be path breaking. The changes in Danish competition policies have already shown path breaking in the sense that they today aim at EU conformity rather than taking care of national business interests.
